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NOTES
HAZARDS OF ENFORCING CLAIMS AGAINST
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IN FLORIDA
Traditionally, courts have been unwilling to adjudicate the rights
of parties who were not properly summoned to appear before them.,
The United States Constitution incorporates this notion through the
vehicle of due process. 2 Rules and statutes of procedure in federal
and state courts require service of process upon a person before in
personam jurisdiction is acquired over him.3 In this manner the
fundamental belief in adequate notice and opportunity to be heard
has been implemented.
Individuals often combine in associations whose aims may be
profitable, pleasurable, or charitable. Serving process upon each individual member can be so difficult or impossible a task that a person
asserting a claim against the members as an association has no legal
remedy if forced to sue the entire membership. But if a claimant tries
to sue less than all, he is proceeding against only a portion of those
whose rights may be affected by the lawsuit.
Satisfying the demands of adequate notice to group members,
while preserving a practical method of acquiring jurisdiction over
the membership of organizations presents an obvious, yet vexing,
dilemma. A person should not be bound by a suit to which he was
not made a party. Conversely, a plaintiff should not be denied a
remedy merely because of procedural difficulties stemming from an
overabundance of defendants. To balance these competing equities
the law has employed the following solutions: (1) treating an organization as an entity, with sufficient legal personality to defend for
itself; (2) requiring all the individual members to be joined in any
action against the organization; and (3) recognizing the organization
as an aggregate of individuals possessing some entity characteristics,
enabling a few members to be sued as representatives of all.
The status of a separate legal entity is achieved through the fiction of incorporation.4 Individuals are granted the privilege of conducting business as a single legal person by the general incorporation
acts of the states.5 Because of this status, it becomes possible to subject all the property owned by the corporation to the jurisdiction of
a court by service of process on a representative of the corporation.6
1.
2.
3.
4.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 4 (d), FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.3, FLA. STAT. ch. 47 (1963).
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636

(1819).
5. E.g., FLA. STAT. c i. 608 (1963).
6.

FLA. STAT. §47.17 (1963).
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Since the corporation is a separate person, only its property is subject
to levy in execution of judgment. This procedure, limiting the
liability of shareholders to their capital investment, also obviates the
necessity of serving each shareholder personally in order to bring the
corporation into court.
Unincorporated associations are not entities at common law, but
are considered aggregates of individuals. 7 The term, "unincorporated
associations," describes a multiplicity of organizations ranging from
enormous labor unions to local garden clubs. Members may be well
organized or loosely affiliated. There is no legal criterion for the
elements of unity that are necessary in order for a group to be called
an association. 8 Membership cards are not always used, neither are
charters or bylaws. Dues may or may not be collected. Obviously, not
all unincorporated groups have sufficient cohesion to enable the law
to label them as entities.
In the absence of a statute, an unincorporated association can be
sued only by personal service of process on each member. 9 Failure to
join all may constitute the fatal defect of lack of an indispensable
party. 1° Once this jurisdictional obstacle is overcome a plaintiff
must then prove that some or all of the individuals have authorized
or ratified the transaction or occurrence on which the suit is based.Judgment in such an action runs against the joint and individual
property of those proved liable.12
By statute in some states, associations may be sued by name without
joining every member as a party defendant. 13 These laws are designed
to alleviate the procedural burden that is imposed upon a plaintiff
who is seeking redress for a wrong committed by the association.
Jurisdiction may be acquired by service of process upon some representatives of the group, such as the principal officers or designated
agents. 4 Typically, the plaintiff who wins a suit against the association after service of this nature, satisfies his judgment from the joint
7. WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS §1 (2d
ed. 1923).
8. Ibid.
9. Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931). See generally
Sturges, UnincorporatedAssociations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383 (1924).
10. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS §929 (1952); LATrY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 150-59 (1951); cf. Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N.E. 270
(1921). See also Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 879-85 (1958).
11. Vader v. Ballou, 151 Wis. 577, 139 N.W. 413 (1913); WRIGHTINCTON,
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS §64, at 382 (2d ed. 1923).
12.

Lamm. v. Stoen, 226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 465

162 Mass. 577, 39 N.E. 414
SOCIATIONS §21, at 29 (1956).
13. E.g., N.Y. GEN. ASS'Ns
14. Ibid.

(1895);

OLECK,

LAW §13;

N.C.

(1939); Willcox v. Arnold,
CORPORATIONS AND As-

NON-PROFIT

GEN. STAT. §1-69-1
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assets only, and not the individual estates of members unless they
have been personally served and found to be at fault.15 The procedures authorized by these statutes vary among the states, but they
generally apply to groups whose members may be discernable (partnerships) or whose size and asset wealth are considerable (labor
unions). These associations have been recognized as possessing sufficient entity characteristics to permit them to be treated as one legal
body for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over jointly held
property. 16
An additional procedural device sometimes available to a person
trying to sue an unincorporated association is the class action. This
action allows suit to be brought against a large membership by the
service of process on a few individuals who defend for all.17 Use of
this device in Florida is limited to situations in which there exists a
common question of law or fact or where the parties are so numerous
as to make it impractical for them all to appear.' s The ultimate effect
of a judgment obtained in a class action is uncertain. The determination of the propriety of representation and scope of the judgment in
a class suit may not be finally made until the judgment is collaterally
attacked in a later proceeding. 9
When dealing with unincorporated associations, courts and legislatures have accorded different treatment to those whose motives involve profit from those organized for some other purpose. In Florida,
this distinction is represented by differing rules for partnerships as
opposed to other associations. The primary concern of this note is the
procedural difficulty encountered when attempting to sue a nonprofit
unincorporated association. A brief examination will first be made of
how partnerships are treated in order to define and contrast other associations. Labor unions will be mentioned separately because they
are distinguished by statute.
PARTNERSHIPS IN FLORIDA

A partnership is a voluntary association organized to carry on a
business for profit. 20 It is generally required that the associates unite
15. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §78, comment c (1942); Developments in the
Law -Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAv. L. tEv. 985,
1081-82 (1963).
16. 1957-1958 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL RYP. 912.
17. E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948);
Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 52 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1951); FED. R. CIv. P.
23; FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.6; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE ff23.02 (2d ed. 1963).
18. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.6.
19. Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1954); cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §26,
comment a (1942).
20. CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER UNINcORPORATED AssoCIATIONS §5 (2d ed.
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in order to conduct a trade for their common benefit, each contributing property or services and sharing in the profits.21 If the associates

do not contemplate earning and sharing profits, the group is not a
22
partnership, but is some other type of unincorporated association.
The foundation of the partnership is in the partners' agreement
to be liable for each other's acts performed within the scope of
partnership activity.23 Each is a general agent of the other partners,
with the power to bind them personally.24 In Florida, by statute,
jurisdiction may be acquired over a partnership by service of process
on any one member of the firm.25 The complaint must name the persons comprising the firm as partners2 6 but a partner may lose his right
to contest irregularities in the service by failing to pose timely objection.27 The statute provides that the plaintiff may, after service
upon any one of the members, "proceed to judgment and execution
against them all."28 While the judgment binds property owned
jointly by the partners and the individual property of any partner
actually served, it is not effective against the individual property of
a partner not personally served. 29 Thus, the partners upon whom
process is personally served are before the court in the dual capacity
of partners and individuals. A partner not personally served is
bound by a judgment only to the extent of his interest in the jointly
held partnership property. 30 This procedure enables a person who
may have dealt with a partner or other agent of a partnership to
serve process upon just one member and be able to look to the joint
assets of the entire firm for damages. It does not recognize the partnership as a distinct entity apart from the members composing it, because
the individuals upon whom process is served do not enjoy the shield
of limited personal liability provided by the corporate form.
LABOR UNIONS

Labor unions may be sued in Florida in their common name by
virtue of Florida Statutes, section 447.11. Prior to the enactment of
1952).
21.

Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 618 (1892).
CRANE, op. cit. supra note 20, §13, at 55.
23. CRANE, op. cit. supra note 20, §5.
24. Ibid.

22.
25.

FLA. STAT. §47.15 (1963).

26.
27.

Speight v. Horne, 101 Fla. 101, 133 So. 574 (1931).
Flinn v. Lisenby, 102 Fla. 777, 136 So. 599 (1931).

28.

FLA. STAT. §47.15 (1963).

29. Epstein & Bro. v. First Nat'l Bank, 92 Fla. 796, 110 So. 354 (1926); Florida
Brewing Co. v. Sendoya, 73 Fla. 660, 74 So. 799 (1917); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Homan, 116 So. 2d 444 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
30. Epstein & Bro. v. First Nat'l Bank, 92 Fla. 796, 801, 110 So. 354, 355 (1926).
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this statute, unions could only be sued as unincorporated associations, either by personal service on all members or a class suit against
some. In 1943 the Florida Legislature removed this procedural obstacle by providing that a union could be sued "in the same manner
and to the same extent as any corporation authorized to do business
in this state." 3' Processes, pleadings, and other papers may be
served on any officer, business agent, manager, or person in charge of
the business of such labor organization. 32 Judgment may be enforced
33
against the unions' "common property only."
This statute goes further toward granting entity status to unions
than does Florida Statutes, section 47.15 relating to partnerships, because it limits the personal liability of individual union members.
The reason for distinguishing between the two types of organizations
as to the scope of levy in execution of judgment is their comparative
size and cohesiveness. In addition, partners establish mutual agency
by agreement; members of unions probably do not contemplate such
an arrangement.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW CONCEPTS

Since enacting the statutes partially alleviating the problem of
enforcing claims against partnerships and labor unions, the Florida
Legislature has not provided additional reforms in the area of suit
against unincorporated associations. Therefore, the remedies available
against other organizations that are not incorporated and do not have
a profit motive, must be determined by reference to the common law.
One reason for a lack of statutory guidance may be the belief that no
problem exists, or that whatever difficulties there are can best be solved
by court application of existing doctrines. One of the purposes of
this note is to point out situations in which the problems of finding,
serving, and levying against the proper defendant subverts substantive
law to procedural form.
Lacking legal personality, unincorporated associations have no
capacity to hold title to real property. 34 There are various ways in
which a court may look at a deed to an unincorporated association.
35
One solution would be to declare the deed void for lack of a grantee.
A contrary view is that a grant to an association vests title in the
persons designated by that name, which would mean that the mem-

31.

FLA. STAT. §447.11 (1963).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Bradley v. O'Hare, 11 App. Div. 2d 15, 28, 202 N.Y.S.2d 141, 153 (1960).
Schein v. Erasmus Realty Co., 194 App. Div. 38, 184 N.Y. Supp. 840

(1920).
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bers own the property as tenants in common.36 Since the identity of
the members may be difficult to ascertain at any one particular moment, it may be more in accord with real property concepts to view
the title as vesting either in named individuals as trustees or in certain
officers for the use and benefit of the members. 37 Personal property
and funds of the association such as dues, fees, and proceeds from
activities are held in a similar manner with actual ownership uncertain.38
But courts have not been conceptually consistent in applying
nonentity reasoning to ownership questions. Carried to its logical
conclusion, a pure aggregate theory would maintain that, since an
association is nothing more than individuals assuming an alias (the
association name), the members own a share in the property that goes
with them when they depart. But a retiring member abandons his
interest in the association's property, therefore, courts acknowledge
that ownership cannot be attributed to the members as individuals.
For example, in Full Gospel Tempel of Tallahassee v. Redd 39 the
plaintiff church acquired land to be used for church purposes, the
title vesting in three trustees who were to hold for the use and benefit of the ministry and membership of the church. When a split developed in religious beliefs, a majority of the membership formed a
new church and directed the trustees to convey the property to them.
The pastor and remaining members brought suit to set aside the
deed executed by the trustees. The chancellor hearing the case ruled
for the plaintiffs, declaring the deed invalid. The appellate court
affirmed, stating: "When appellants withdrew from the parent church
and organized themselves into The Full Gospel Temple, they carried
nothing but their membership with them; the parent church retained
title to the properties."40 The effect of this and other decisions is
much the same as if the association itself owned the property as an
41
entity.
ContractActions
Attributing characteristics similar to a legal entity to an unincorporated association is relevant to the determination of how it may trans36. Nesbitt v. Letz Hunting Club, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 706 (C.P. 1957); LArrY,
INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 150-51 (1951).

37. See In re Welton's Will, 156 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
38. Brown v. Stoerkel, 74 Mich. 269, 41 N.W. 921 (1889); see Lamm v. Stoen,
226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 465 (1939), in which the court found the "assets of the
association" available to satisfy a judgment.
39. 82 So. 2d 589 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).

40. Id. at 590.
41. See Renschler v. Brantley, 234 Ark. 322, 351 S.W.2d 842 (1961), holding
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act business. The most common situation involves contract obligations
in which some member of the group, ostensibly acting on behalf of
all the membership, agrees to purchase goods, perform a service, or
repay money. Undoubtedly the association fulfills its share of the
bargain in the overwhelming majority of cases, but occasionally there
will be a breach of contract. The question most vital to the injured
party is "to whom can he look for damages." If the association is not
a legal entity, it is difficult to argue that an agent can have the power
to bind it as a principal to a contract. The common law view is that
a nonentity can have no agents. 42 Therefore, the persons purporting
to act on behalf of an association are either acting for the individual
members or for themselves. In order to hold the individual members
liable, the plaintiff must prove that they authorized or ratified the
43
transaction.
Authorization relates to actions by the members sufficient to establish their responsibility for acts performed by someone for the
association. The bare fact of membership does not constitute authorization. 44 Nevertheless, if the purpose of the organization were
such that membership itself implied authorization, a jury may be
allowed to hold all the members liable without further proof of
authorization." 5 In one instance, all the members of a college class,
who attended a meeting at which it was decided to contract for the
publishing of a yearbook, were held individually liable for the amount
owed to the printer.46 It can be contended, however, that a member
should not be held to have authorized an action unless he voted in
favor of it.
Ratification is even more vague a concept because there are virtually no objective criteria by which it can be established. In a leading Wisconsin case,4 7 the defendant was found to have ratified a
contract to pay the purchase price of materials furnished to a committee of which-he was a member. There was evidence that the defendant, who did not personally deal with the supplier, knew of and
consented to the terms of the bargain. This knowledge and consent
was found sufficient for ratification.
that the treasurer of a local alcoholics anonymous could not arbitrarily pay half
the association's funds to the new chapter formed by departing members.
42. Ross v. Gerung, 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954); Henry Pilcher's Sons, Inc. v.
Martin, 102 Fla. 672, 136 So. 386 (1931); accord, Burton v. Grand Rapids School
Furniture Co., 10 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 31 S.W. 91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
43. Ehrlich v. Willenski, 138 Fed. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1905); 3 FLA. JUR. Associations
and Clubs §9 (1955).

44.

Hann v. Nored, 233 Ore. 302, 313, 378 P.2d 569, 575 (1963).

45.

IVRIGHTINGTON,

UNINCORPORATED

AssOCIATIONS AND BUSINEss TRusrs

§64, at

386 (2d ed. 1923).
46. Willcox v. Arnold, 162 Mass. 577, 39 N.E. 414 (1895).
47. Vader v. Ballou, 151 Wis. 577, 139 N.W. 413 (1913).
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The theory of these holdings rests on express or implied authorization or ratification and not on a general power of agency as is found
in a partnership. But an agent acting without authority, or for a nonexistent principal may bind himself personally to any contract he
makes. Should there be no positive manner in which a plaintiff can
establish authorization or ratification of the members, plaintiff may
look to the agent for damages. Thus at common law, the agent of
an association may turn out to be its surety if the association defaults.
The following Florida cases demonstrate the inequities that result
from the view that an association cannot be a party to a contract. In
I. W. Phillips& Co. v. Hall,48 five individuals signed a promissory note
as a "Board of Trustees" for an unincorporated church association.
When the association defaulted, the lender sued the signers personally.
The Florida Supreme Court held that since there was no principal
for whom the trustees acted, the trustees were liable for the note
49
themselves. The court stated:
[F]or an agent, who signs a note on behalf of a principal, to be
relieved of personal liability on the instrument, he must have
been duly authorized by his principal to sign it. If he signs on
behalf of a nonexistent principal or a principal without capacity
to give authority, his action is equivalent to signing without
authority for a principal who is capable of acting for himself.
This result was in accord with an earlier Florida decision that held
the contracting agent of an unincorporated association personally
liable when the association refused to pay a debt owed to the plaintiff. 50 This is the possible trap into which unsuspecting "agents" of

unincorporated associations may fall. Even if the signature on an
instrument is signed "as trustee" or "for the club" the individual may
be binding himself.
Under another line of authority in Florida, plaintiff could be
precluded from recovery on the theory that an agreement made with
a person acting for a nonexistent principal is not a contract at all.
For example, in Henry Pilcher's Sons, Inc. v. Martin,51 plaintiff sold
an organ to defendants purporting to act for the Board of Stewards of
the Clearwater M.E. Church. Two notes, totaling $1,782 and signed
"A. G. McQuagge, Secretary to the Board," were given to the
plaintiff as consideration for the organ. When defendants defaulted
on the note the vendor sued a large group of individuals "acting as
a Board of Stewards." The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer
48. 99 Fla. 1206, 128 So. 635 (1930).
49. Id. at 1214, 128 So. at 638.
50. Florida So. R.R. v. Steen, 45 Fla. 313, 34 So. 571 (1903).
51. 102 Fla. 672, 136 So. 386 (1931).
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and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the individual
members of the board could not be held liable since it was not alleged
that any of them had signed the note sued upon. The signer himself,
McQuagge, had acted in a "representative capacity" as Secretary to
the Board, but apparently was not a member. He was a defendant
in the suit, but the court refused to hold him personally liable and
distinguished Phillips on the ground that no one could, in a representative capacity, bind a nonentity. Since this was a matter of law,
"the payee was charged with notice that the note was executed by a
person in his representative capacity and the payee took the note
52
with the knowledge that it was executed without legal authority."
In effect, McQuagge bound no one in any capacity.
Although the court in this case distinguished this situation from
Phillipson the basis of the "representative capacity" of a person acting
for an association from an actual officer who becomes personally bound
when he signs, the rationale of the two results is directly conflicting.
It is not logical, as the Phillips opinion points out, to assume that
the signers of the note "did not contemplate the creation of a legal
' 3
obligation, capable of enforcement."
54
In Hunt v.Adams, the Florida Supreme Court was again faced
with the question whether an action against an individual signing
as agent for an unincorporated association could be maintained.
Plaintiff-architects had sued on a contract for professional services
entered into by an unincorporated church building committee. The
defendant, Adams, signed the contract for the association. He demurred to the declaration and the trial court sustained the demurrer.
Plaintiff appealed, but the supreme court affirmed the ruling on the
theory that the agent could not be liable because he signed "only
as chairman of the building committee and not personnally." 55 Thus,
the court repeated its assertion that contracts made with unincorporated associations are not enforceable against the signing agent.
These cases exemplify the liability twilight zone spoken of by one
writer.56 On the one hand, the associational form may so blur the
personal liability of the members that it causes plaintiff to be unable
to find the proper defendants. But on the other hand, an individual
member, if found to have consented to the transaction or signed for
the association, may be personally liable for the entire amount of a
contract.
Since neither of these two extremes are very equitable, some middle
ground should be available. If plaintiff could sue an organization as
52. Id. at 678, 136 So. at 388.
53. I. W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall, 99 Fla. 1206, 1215, 128 So. 635, 638 (1930).
54. 111 Fla. 164, 149 So. 24 (1933).
55. Id. at 165, 149 So. at 25.
56. OuEcK, NON-PRoFrr CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS §18, at 26 (1956).
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an entity capable of employing agents and enforce a judgment only
against the organization's funds, the all-or-nothing approach taken by
courts at various times would be eliminated. Blocking this solution
though is the common law theory that an association is not a legally
recognized unit and cannot be a party to a contract.
Tort Liability
Related to the notion that an unincorporated association cannot
be a principal party to a contract is the doctrine that the members
are not liable for the torts of a person acting as an agent for the
association. The rule in the partnership situation is that the firm
is liable for torts of its agents acting within the scope of their employment. Unincorporated associations have no general agents. This
places upon a plaintiff, seeking damages for tortious injury inflicted
by someone acting for the association, the burden of proving that the
particular act was authorized or ratified by the individual members.
Illustrating this point is the Florida case of Mercury Cab Owners'
Association v. Jones.57 The plaintiff was a passenger in a car that collided with a taxi marked with the name "Mercury Cab." In a tort
action for damages, the plaintiff joined the owner of the cab, the
driver, and the Mercury Cab Owners' Association as defendants. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against the owner and driver
but not the association. Upon motion the trial judge amended the
judgment to hold the association liable also, but this ruling was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court. The court found that the association was a nonprofit association whose only purpose was to furnish
radio service to its members. Therefore, it could not be held liable on
general agency principles, and since plaintiff had not proved specific
authorization or ratification by the members, he had failed to establish
that the driver was an agent under the control of the association.
By comparison, had the association been a partnership of taxi
owners in which the partners divided profits, there seems to be little
doubt that the plaintiff could have recovered against the association,
because the driver would certainly have been within the scope of employment while driving the cab.
The rationale expressed by the court in Mercury was that since
the purpose of the association was limited to furnishing communications, the members did not expect nor did they authorize anyone to
drive a cab as their individual agents.
Other courts have recognized that the limited purposes for which
a nonprofit organization is formed significantly narrows the range of
authorized activity. A court may find the act so remote from the
57. 79 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1955).
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group's intended function as to negate authorization or consent. An
example of this occurred when a Junior Chamber of Commerce agreed
to sponsor a golf tournament to be held on a course owned by the
county. A sign placed in the clubhouse by a course employee caused
a competing golfer to trip and fall. He sued the Juriior Chamber
of Commerce for personal injuries resulting from its alleged negligence in allowing the dangerous placement of the sign. The complaint
was dismissed. The court held that the association had no control
over the premises and that the golf course employee was not acting
as an agent of the association when preparing the clubhouse for the
tournament. 58 Phrased another way, plaintiff had failed to connect
the sponsoring of a tournament with the specific negligent act in
issue, therefore the members had not consented to the tortious conduct.
Unlike the previous case, in which the association was not liable
as a matter of law, there are situations in which the question of
authorization is allowed to go to the jury for determination. In the
recent Ohio case of Lyons v. American Legion Post Number 650,59
the defendant-unincorporated association conducted a fish fry in a
building rented by it for the occasion. The plaintiff's husband was
injured and subsequently died from noxious gas escaping from a defective heater on the premises. In a suit against all the members of the
Post individually, the Ohio Supreme Court held the complaint stated
a cause of action. The opinion recognized, however, that upon trial
the members would have to be linked as "active participants in the
affair resulting in plaintiff-decedent's alleged injuries, and, furthermore, that they knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
known of the defective condition of the instrumentality claimed to
have caused the injury."60
Courts will differ on whether the complaint alleges sufficient
responsibility on the part of individual members to withstand demurrer. Relying on the general rule that membership alone is not
authorization, a New York court dismissed a libel suit against a union
for defamation published in a union newspaper, because the complaint did not allege that each member had authorized or ratified
the tortious words. 61 A forceful dissent in the case stressed the point
that by allowing the editorial board to remain in office after the
alleged libel was printed, the members had ratified the action.62 This
58. Jopes v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959).
59. 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961).

60. Id. at 337, 175 N.E.2d at 737.
61. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951).
62. Id. at 283, 101 N.E.2d at 687 (dissenting opinion). Perhaps the dissenters
were also concerned with the practical impossibility of proving that each of the
many and scattered union members had agreed to publish the specific words.
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dissent illustrates the use of ratification as a device for tagging the
group with liability for an act that may not have been consented to
originally, but for which no remedial steps are taken.
Thus, where torts are involved, the question of authorization or
ratification may turn on issues relating to reasonable expectations of
what the members conceive the association's functions to be and
whether they knew or should have known of a particular act. Despite
the doctrinal assertions that liability of the members in either tort
or contract depends upon authorization or ratification, it appears
that somewhat different tests are employed by the courts for the two
types of action.63 Underlying this distinction may be the assumption
that a claimant seeking to hold an unincorporated association liable
on a contract is chargeable with knowledge of the association's lack
of legal character. Thus, a contract plaintiff may justifiably be barred
because in the eyes of the law he has notice of the nature of the group
with which he has dealt. On the other hand, a tort victim may not
have voluntarily come into contact with the group and can be charged
with no fault akin to contributory negligence for being injured by an
unincorporated rather than a corporate enterprise. Therefore, emphasis may properly be said to shift from an examination of what
knowledge can be imputed to a plaintiff in contract actions, to what
risks the members of an association have consented to in tort cases.
In either situation, courts and commentators contend that persons
joining voluntary nonprofit organizations do not agree to be responsible for acts that extend beyond the range of activities germain to
organizational purposes.

64

JURISDICTION AT COMMON LAW

The contract and tort liability imposed upon unincorporated associations, their members, or those acting ostensibly as their agents are
matters of substantive law. The issues are likely to culminate in
the jury question whether there was sufficient authorization to bind

Compare Pascale v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147 (D. Mass. 1951) holding a complaint
for libel against union members as a class sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court pointed out that a libel can be the joint responsibility of many
individuals even though they each do not separately utter a libel.
63. See Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 283, 101 N.E.2d 683, 687 (1951)

(dissenting opinion).
64. E.g., Mercury Cab Owners' Ass'n v. Jones, 79 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1955);
McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 30 N.E. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1891); OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS §21, at 29 (1956); cf. Crane, Liability of
Unincorporated Associations for Tortious Injury to a Member, 16 VAND. L. REv.
319, 321 (1963), discussing degree of control over the association's functions as
relevant to determination whether a member can be termed a co-principal in the
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individual assets of the members or the joint assets of the group.
But, before a plaintiff can reach that stage in a lawsuit, he must employ some procedural device to enable him to acquire jurisdiction over
the entire membership.
While the association may purport to deal with the general public
as if possessed of all the attributes of a legal entity, a claimant may
learn otherwise should recourse to legal remedies become necessary.
The unincorporated association can suddenly develop acute schizophrenia, abandoning the single personality it assumed when signing
an agreement and dissolving into as many individual personalities
as there are members. What appeared to be one group suddenly
scatters into innumerable individuals clothed with a presumption of
separateness. This phenomenon occurs because the common law
rule is that an unincorporated association cannot be sued as an entity,
regardless of how it may have represented itself on other occasions. 65
Time and again, clearing the procedural hurdle of serving process on
each member has proved to be plaintiff's most difficult task along the
steeplechase route to recovery.
This is not to say that the common law rule may not be supported
or justified. In one instance, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the word "club" applied to persons who left their liquor bottles with
the owner of a restaurant they frequented. 66 Surely, it would be unfair to sieze assets that are personal rather than joint possessions as
the result of a lawsuit against the association unless each member were
personally served and allowed to defend.
But if a group as large and powerful as a labor union were to loom
on the horizon, possessing wealth in its own right, a plaintiff at common law would be faced with the same procedural task as if suing a
two-man dub.
The situation with regard to labor unions was rectified by the
Florida Legislature's passage of section 447.1 1. 7 As to all other
unincorporated nonprofit associations, the common law remedy still
prevails in the state. Illustrating the procedural obstacles that confront
a plaintiff are two recent Florida district court decisions.
State ex rel. Epperson v. Florio6 was a suit by riparian owners to
enjoin another riparian owner from allowing the latter's premises to
venture. Members of small groups, better able to control organizational activities,
can be found to have consented to a particular act while those in larger groups
may not have. For a case distinguishing between voting and nonvoting members
and their degree of control see Bartosiewicz v. Verhovay Fraternal Ins. Ass'n, 20
Pa. D. & C.2d 5 (C.P. 1956).
65. Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931).

66. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
67. FLA. STAT. §447.11 (1963).

68. 119 So. 2d 305 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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be used for water ski shows put on by an unincorporated association
known as the Tampa Ski Bees. No individual member was made a
party defendant, but an answer had been filed on behalf of the association. A decree was entered enjoining skiing by the defendant,
Tampa Ski Bees. On appeal the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed on the ground that an unincorporated association could not
be sued in its associational name. This question of lack of capacity
to be sued was raised for the first time on appeal, but the court held
that the point was a fundamental one involving jurisdiction and was
not waived by failure to assert it in the lower court. The court based
69
its ruling on the traditional common law principle:
Since there is no statutory authority to sue or be sued in the
association's common name in the Florida jurisdiction, the common law rule for making effective service on a voluntary organization must be pursued.
In Walton-Okaloosa-SantaRosa Medical Society v. Spires,70 a group
of doctors brought suit to enjoin the defendant medical society from
expelling them. Process was served on the president of the unincorporated society with the apparent intent of acquiring jurisdiction
over the entire membership. The lower court issued a temporary
restraining order against the society. On appeal, the society assigned
as error the failure to grant a motion to quash service of process. The
defendant's argument was that service upon the president was ineffective to bind the entire association. The First District Court of
Appeal agreed with the defendant and reversed, holding that to bind
the association each of its individual members must be served. The
complaint had alleged that the Board of Governors of the Florida
Medical Association wrongfully expelled plaintiff from its membership.
The result of expulsion from the society would be removal of plaintiff from the staff of the hospital where he practiced. The court was
not impressed with the magnitude of this harm and advised plaintiff
that "if the threatened action is to be effectively enjoined, the individual members of the society must be made parties defendant to the
71
suit and properly served with process."
The reason for the common law rule that an association cannot be
sued unless all its members are joined, is the fear of adjudicating the
rights of persons not before the court. In Johnston v. Albritton72
the court said that one individual member could not "be subject to

69. Id. at 309.
70. 153 So. 2d 325 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
71. Id. at 326.
72. 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931).
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personal judgment by service on another member."7 3 The Second
District Court in Florio was of the opinion that "the injunctive decree of the court, which is in personam in nature, has the effect of
prohibiting all members from skiing ... even though these individual
members were not served."7 4 The First District Court said that summons on the president of an association was "void, invalid and legally
insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court over the individual members of the society." 75 These courts state that rights of individuals
as such are being determined by the litigation. This reasoning
weakens, however, when tested against the relief being sought.
If there is a contract or tort suit for damages and the association
is made a defendant without process being served on every member,
a judgment for the plaintiff could be made to bind only the association's funds. Since, as previously mentioned, courts hold that the
joint property is in effect owned by the association rather than by the
members, it would be consistent for a court to issue a judgment that
binds only association property. This would not enable plaintiff to
levy on the individual property of any member.
If plaintiff is seeking an injunction, the action to be enjoined is
often group rather than individual action. It could well be argued
in Florio that individual members of the Tampa Ski Bees could ski
on the lake even though the association could not put on ski shows;
a fortiori, the conduct to be enjoined in Walton was only that action
taken collectively by a medical society acting as an association. Injunctions in these cases would in no way affect any person as an individual,
hence it is urged that the concern with service of process upon each
member is not always a valid ground for denying the plaintiff an
opportunity to sue the association through its chosen representatives.
Whether plaintiff can establish a cause of action by proving he
has been injured, whether the injury was caused by someone acting
for the association, and whether there are associational funds that
can be subjected to execution are all questions of fact that the common law does not allow plaintiff to ask unless he can serve process
upon every member of an unincorporated association.
Remanding plaintiff to suit against the members individually requires joining them all in one action, because each owns an interest
in the joint property. If plaintiff does not serve process on all the
members, those who were served can preliminarily raise the defense of
failure to join indispensable parties. It is presumed that the members
78
who raise this defense will have to supply the missing names.
78. Id. at 1288, 134 So. at 565.
74. State ex rel. Epperson v. Florio, supra note 68, at 309.
75. Walton-Okaloosa-Santa Rosa Medical Soc'y v. Spires, supra note 70, at 326.
76. See Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 100, 130 N.E. 270, 271 (1921). In
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There may be genuine disputes, however, over membership status,
77
and this raises questions courts are traditionally hesitant to explore.
Should the court be unable to acquire jurisdiction over all the members, plaintiff may not be able to proceed against only a portion of
the membership.
These problems do not confront a person seeking redress against
a legal entity. The identity and location of the individual shareholders of a corporation are irrelevant, because all the corporate assets
7
can be subjected to execution by service on designated agents. 8 As for

unincorporated profit-making enterprises in Florida, the names of
the principal owners are a matter of public record if the business
is conducted under a fictitious name.7 9 Service of process upon just
one partner binds all partnership property.8 0 Claimants against nonprofit unincorporated associations, however, must seek relief against
aggregates of individuals. While the acquisition of jurisdiction by
Maguire the Massachusetts court said that if the members served with process in
a suit against an unincorporated association desired to plead nonjoinder, they
must supply the names of the missing members. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has recognized associational right to privacy, so a court's power to compel
furnishing membership lists may not be absolute. Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 83 Sup. Ct. 889 (1963), 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 493 (1963).
77. Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729 (1941). In Harper v. Hoecherl,
153 Fla. 29, 14 So. 2d 179 (1943), the court said of membership disputes, "the
great weight, if not the universal rule, of the authorities is to the effect that
ordinarily courts will not interfere to settle differences between a labor union, or
other voluntary associations, and its members. Membership in such organizations
being noncompulsory, and the members having stipulated upon admission to
abide by its rules and decisions or submit to disciplinary action, or expulsion,
courts have generally left the settlements of their internal affairs to the organization, to be conformed to by its members .... '"Id. at 32, 14 So. 2d at 180.
Should it become necessary to fix the membership at a certain time in order
to determine who the proper defendants in a suit against the association should
be, a court might well find itself ensnarled in problems of wrongful expulsion.
Timing is another factor that may require judicial attention. A person who
was not a member at the time of the alleged contract or tort should not be liable
for it, yet a judgment reaching the association's funds will affect joint property in
which he has an interest. Conversely, a member at the time the contract or tort
occurred, who has subsequently resigned or been expelled, could be liable for
damages even though he no longer owns a share of the association's property. It is
unclear which of these two members should or must be joined as a necessary
party.
Additionally, the organizational structure of some groups may be so vague
that no one knows who the members are. See, e.g., the discussion in LA'vry, INTRODUcrION TO BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONs 343-44 (1951).
78. FLA. STAT. §§608.44, .47 (1963).
79. FLA. STAT. §865.09 (1963). This statute does not apply to unincorporated
associations unless they conduct a "business" with the statutory definition. Most
unincorporated associations probably would not be engaged in business.
80. FLA. STAT. §47.15 (1963).
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service of process upon each individual is theoretically possible, it is
a procedural millstone that could drag down a just cause of action.
The results in Florio and Walton are sparkling examples of this
contention.
On the other hand, if the association has in fact acted as a unit,
through officers or agents, why should not service of process upon
such officers or agents be sufficient to vest a court with jurisdiction over
the association's assets? The fiction that an unincorporated association
is a mere aggregate of individuals should not paralyze all judicial
activity. A court could limit a judgment to be effective against
jointly held assets only. Surely, a judiciary that pierces a corporate
veil could be equally adroit at moulding a reluctant entity.
Not all courts have meekly yielded to the inflexible common law
doctrine that each of the members of an unincorporated association
must be served. In 1922, the United States Supreme Court boldly
brushed aside technicalities by holding that an unincorporated association could be sued in the same manner as a corporation, even
when not specifically permitted by statute. This pronouncement came
in the famous case of the United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co.81 In Coronado, suit was brought by the owner of the coal company against the United Mine Workers International Union, a district
branch of the union, the locals within the district, and sixty-five individuals, mostly members of one union or another. The complaint
alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrain interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act and had destroyed plaintiff's
property. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed because the defendants' acts did not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce as required for a finding of liability under the Sherman Act.
The Court shattered precedent, however, by holding that service of
process on the principal officers was sufficient to bring the union
itself in as a party.
In the opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, it was acknowledged that at common law an unincorporated association could only
sue or be sued in the names of its members and liability enforced
82
against each one. But, the Court pointed out:
It would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power
as this International Union has in the raising of large funds
and in directing the conduct of four hundred thousand members in carrying on, in a wide territory, industrial controversies
and strikes, out of which so much unlawful injury to private
rights is possible, could assemble its assets to be used therein
81.
82.

259 U.S. 344 (1922).
Id. at 388.
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free from liability for injuries by torts committed in course of
such strikes. To remand persons injured to a suit against each
of the 400,000 members to recover damages and to levy on his
share of the strike fund, would be to leave them remediless.
The holding in Coronado stands as judicial recognition of the need
for change in the common law principal that an unincorporated association could not be sued in its own name. Perhaps in deference to
the traditional belief that courts find rather than make law, the
Court was careful to point out that they were not legislating a sub83
stantive change, but merely altering a procedural device.
As a matter of substantive law, all the members of the union
engaged in a combination doing unlawful injury are liable to
suit and recovery, and the only question is whether when
they have voluntarily, and for the purpose of acquiring concentrated strength and the faculty of quick unit action and
elasticity, created a self-acting body with great funds to accomplish their purpose, they may not be sued as this body, and
the funds they have accumulated may not be made to satisfy
claims of injuries unlawfully caused in carrying out their
united purpose.
There is logic in this approach, based on recognition of the actual
"strength" and facility for "unit action" possessed by a group. While
there was no specific statute or rule allowing the union to be sued
as such, the "state of federal legislation" plus the inequity of requiring plaintiff to sue the individual tort-feasors, compelled the
Coronado result.
The Coronado decision applied only to a labor union, an admittedly unique association. Also, it came at a time of intense judicial
hostility to the labor movement.8 4 The rationale in the opinion, however, spawned Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 (b), which applies
to all unincorporated associations. The rule provides in part that
a partnership or other unincorporated association ... may sue or be
83. Id. at 390. The adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 (b) reflects
the procedural nature of this holding by looking to "the law of the state in which
the district court is held" to determine the capacity of an unincorporated association to be sued. If the association lacks capacity under state law it cannot
be sued in federal court unless there is being asserted "a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States." This preserves the law
of the forum state concept in diversity of citizenship cases while preventing what
the federal rules consider a procedural matter from keeping associations out of
court where federal rights are involved. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PacncE 117.25
(2d ed. 1963). See generally WARuEN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
660 (1929).
84. Cox & BoK, CASES ON LABOR LAw 90 (5th ed. 1962).

WITHOUT INCOR'O-
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sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against
it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the
United States...."
JURISDICTION BY STATUTE

Recognizing that without adequate procedural devices for bringing
a defendant into court there can be no recovery under substantive
law, several states have enacted statutes enabling jurisdiction to be
acquired over an unincorporated association by serving process on its
principal officers or agents.8 5 These acts do not purport to alter the
law relating to individual authorization or ratification that plaintiff
must allege and prove. They are designed to eliminate the procedural
step of personal service on each member.
The distinction between procedure and substance, however, causes
difficulties, even in jurisdictions having statutes. While the association can be brought into court without service of process on each
member, plaintiff ostensibly must still prove that each is individually
liable:8 6
However, the procedural change embodied in the enabling
statute did not alter the substantive rights or liabilities of the
parties. The liability to be enforced in any such suit is still
that of the individual members as individuals....
Thus in New York, the statute provides that an unincorporated
association can be sued by serving a principal officer, but the cause of
action must be one "for or upon which the plaintiff may maintain
such an action or special proceeding against all the associates, by
reason of their . . . liability therefore, either jointly or severally."8 7
One case, decided under this statute, held that a complaint against
an unincorporated association was defective because of its "failure
to allege that all the individual members of the union authorized
or ratified the acts complained of."88 This followed the reasoning
of an older New York decision8 9 In that case, plaintiff had sued an
unincorporated association, formed as a citizens council to aid in
law enforcement, for breach of contract. Plaintiff, an attorney who
rendered legal service to the council, was seeking to recover his fees.
The court found that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment because
he failed to prove all the members liable, either jointly or severally.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

E.g., N.Y. GEN. ASS'NS LAw §13; N.C. GEN. STAT. §1.69.1 (Gum. Supp. 1963).
Prin v. DeLuca, 218 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
N.Y. GEN. ASS'NS LAw §13.
Prin v. DeLuca, 218 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 30 N.E. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
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The court pointed out that no general agency was to be implied
merely from the fact of association, as would be the case with a
partnership.
Courts in other states, in which associations may be sued without
service on each member, may find it easier, however, to speak in terms
of general agency. In a recent New Mexico case,90 the plaintiff was
suing an unincorporated association for personal injuries resulting
from the collapse of defendant's concession stand. The women's
auxiliary, which was in charge of the stand, was held liable for the
tort of an employee who moved a truck against the stand causing a
beam to fall on the plaintiff. In effect, the court held the association
liable for the tort of an agent. There was no mention of individual
authorization for the particular act of moving the truck that caused
the injury, but since the members approved of the operation of the
stand they must have agreed to assume the incidental risks involved.
As procedural statutes facilitate treating unincorporated associations as entities, courts can also begin to draw a distinction between
the liability of individual members and that of associations as units.
It can be argued that if a majority of the members can be connected
with the making of a contract or the commission of a tort, joint
property could be subject to execution without necessarily exposing
any member to liability in his individual capacity. Indeed, there are
cases that recognize this dichotomy even though it is achievement of
limited liability through judicial rather than legislative proclamation.
A Pennsylvania court recognized this distinction when it refused to
hold the officers of a union individually liable in tort, despite the
affirmance of a judgment against the union.91 Although these individual members were not shown to have authorized or ratified the
action, the association was liable. This result actually changes the
substantive common law rule that required proof of fault of all the
members before levy on joint property was permitted.
This attitude is further illustrated by the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Dunne.92 A new member of an association was injured during an initiation ceremony and sued the group
plus eleven individual members for the alleged tort. Colorado had
adopted a rule similar to Federal Rule 17 (b) allowing an unincorporated association to be sued in its common name. The Thomas court
held that the association was liable to the plaintiff for the injuries
he suffered, but the suit against the individuals should have been
90.

Weese v. Stoddard, 63 N.M. 20, 312 P.2d 545 (1956).

91. Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954).
92. 131 Colo. 20, 279 P.2d 427 (1955). For a comment approving the result
reached in this case see 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 169 (1956). This case is also discussed
in Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Associations for Tortious Injury to a
Member, 16 VAND. L. REV. 319, 324 (1963).
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dismissed because there was no connection between the negligent act
and the individuals sued that could make them personally liable.
Clearly the court recognized that although plaintiff cannot prove each
member to be a tort-feasor, he still may recover against the group, contrary to the common law.
CrAss ACTION

It is beyond the scope of this note to delve into all the ramifications of class actions. They must be mentioned however, because of
their use in allowing large associations to be sued without serving
process on each individual member.
The class action is an equitable device by which representatives of
a group may sue or defend for all its members. If the right or duty
is joint, necessitating joinder of all parties at law, the action is a true
class suit. If there are numerous parties, a common question of law
or fact, and joinder would be permissive but not compulsory in law,
93
the class suit is termed spurious.
In Florida, Civil Procedure Rule 3.6 provides that "when the
question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole."
Under this rule, and its predecessors, actions have been successfully
brought in equity against unincorporated associations. 94 In all of these
suits however, the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief. 95 It is doubtful whether an action can be brought as a class suit unless there is
some basis for equity jurisdiction other than numerous defendants.
Massachusetts courts have held class suits improper in tort actions for
damages, pointing out that plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law
available to him by suing all the members individually. 96 A class
suit has never been brought under Florida equity rules in which contract or tort damages were the only relief sought. It is questionable

93. Note, Class Suits, 9 U. FLA. L. Ray. 75 (1956). The distinction between
true and spurious is easier to draw in theory than in practice. Courts may confuse
the terms "joint" and "common," yet these are the key words in determining
whether joinder is compulsory or permissive. If parties must be joined at law, they
need not be numerous for a class action to be proper. But if joinder is merely permissive, a showing of many parties may be the sole basis for a representative suit.
See Developments in the Law -Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
HARv. L. Rv. 874, 930-31 (1958).
94. Ross v. Gerung, 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954); Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots
Ass'n Int'l, 52 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1951).
95. Ibid.
96. Spector v. Loreck, 342 Mass. 685, 175 N.E.2d 262 (1961); Maguire v.
Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N.E. 270 (1921).
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therefore, whether mere multiplicity of defendants would indepen97
dently support equity jurisdiction.
If equitable relief is sought, however, the class action may be a
proper as well as a convenient method of acquiring jurisdiction over
members of unincorporated associations. Presumably the suit would
be a true class action, because joinder of all the members would be
compulsory were the action to be brought at law. There is ambiguity in rule 3.6, however, and a court could require a showing of
numerous parties in order for plaintiff to employ the class suit.
These uncertainties were brought to light in City of Lakeland v. Chase
National Co.

98

The statute authorized class representation when "the question" is one of common or general interest. A "question" related to what? Question of fact or law? A question related to
the "subject matter" of the suit, or to the "object" of the
suit? A "question" related to a common right - to several rights
- or to joint rights? If the "interest" be "common or general"
may the rights be separate and distinct? Also must they depend on the same basic factors? In [sic] the rule a matter of
indulgence when joinder would otherwise be required? Or is it
a matter of convenience for the benefit of the parties and the
court?
There is of course no criteria for the number of parties that are
required for the defendants to constitute a class so numerous as to
97. See Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948). Class suits have been held proper
in pursuing remedies against unincorporated associations when the cause of action
was in tort. This result, however, was achieved through Federal Rule 23, by
virtue of which class actions were made available where either legal or equitable
relief was sought. In White v. Quisenberry, 14 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1953) the
court explained the effect of rule 23 (a) (I). "Since the passage of Rule 23 (a) (1),
some confusion has arisen as to the scope of its application. At first, some
authorities thought that it should be accorded no broader scope than the doctrine
of virtual representation itself, and thus be confined to class actions sounding only
in equity. The reason for this point of view was the time-honored rule that a
judgment rendered in a law action cannot affect a person not actually named as
However, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court Advisory
a party therein ....
Committee, which helped formulate the Federal Rules, interpreted Rule 23 (a) (1)
as applying to all civil actions without showing deference to distinctions formerly
existing between actions at law and those in equity." Id. at 350.
Florida courts, unlike the federal courts, retain the distinction between law
and equity. Therefore it would seem that the rationale expressed above would
limit class suits to equitable actions in jurisdictions such as Florida, which maintain
a division between law and equity. Cf. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE '123.02 (2d
ed. 1963). Rule 23 "applies an equitable doctrine of joinder to all civil actions,
whether formerly denominated legal or equitable."
98. 159 Fla. 783, 791, 32 So. 2d 833, 838 (1947).
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be impracticable to bring them all before the court in one suit. The
Florida Supreme Court has said "impracticable" in joining all parties
does not mean "inconvenient." Thus where the membership of an
association is huge, there may be no doubt as to the "impracticability"
of serving all its members. If the association is small, a class suit may
not be necessary because the members can be individually served
with process. In between these extremes lies the grey area of ambiguity in which there is ample room for the equities of a particular
case, plus possible judicial preferences, to be asserted under the guise
of procedure. It should also be noted that if plaintiff brings a class
action, he may be deprived of the right to have a jury determine the
issues of fact.
Another haunting uncertainty surrounding the class suit relates to
the scope of the judgment that plaintiff may be able to obtain.
Parties not before the court cannot be personally bound by a suit.
Their interest in joint property, however, may be extinguished as a
result of the action if they are adequately represented. The determination of how well an individual was represented and to what
extent he is bound by a class suit gives rise to constitutional as well
as procedural issues. One of the questions raised is: 99
[D]etermining the liability of the individual members of the
class because of their participation in, ratification of, or authorization of the . . . conduct . . . ascertaining the share of
plaintiffs' recovery, if any, to be borne by each member of the
defendant class, and assuring that the absent members are afforded due process.
This may well explain why Judge Learned Hand said that courts
employ class actions "when put to it to prevent a failure of justice."100
The limitation of such suits, however, is by no means well defined.
Thus, in a class action against an unincorporated association, in
Florida, plaintiff may have to establish: (1) that the members constitute a true class or are so numerous as to make personal service on
each "impracticable," (2) an equitable cause of action, (3) adequacy
of representation of those not served by those that are, (4) joint
liability, and (5) existence of property that may be subjected to
execution.
An author, writing on class suits in actions against unincorporated
associations, points out that "the scope of the representative action
is notoriously uncertain."'' 01 He suggests that since the action is
99. Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311, 317 (1st Cir. 1959).
100. Sperry Prods. v. Association of Am. R.R., 132 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1942).
101. 16 MODERN L. REv. 359 (1963). For the possible effect of a judgment in

a class action see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 190 (8th Cir.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1964],
Art.
4
[
[Vol.
XVII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

against the members as individuals rather than the association, judgment may run against their individual assets rather than joint assets.
Certainly this would be a giant step backward from the semi-entity
status granted by virtue of some statutes.
OTHER PROCEDURAL DEVICES

In addition to or supplemental to the procedure already discussed,
other doctrines may be available to a plaintiff who is seeking to reach
the funds of an unincorporated association.
Equitable Lien
This device can be better illustrated than explained. A classic
example of the application of this mysterious lien was presented by
Society of Shakers v. Watson.10 2 The society was an unincorporated
church community. The members donated all their property to the
association, and nothing was owned individually. Trustees, elected
to conduct the association's business, executed a promissory note in
return for a loan. When the association failed to pay the note, the
holder sought redress in the courts. The common law procedure for
suit against an unincorporated association was obviously inadequate
because the membership was so large and fluid that joining all the
necessary parties would not have been possible. Moreover, no one
member owned any property. This made a personal judgment against
an individual member worthless. Clearly, the holder's procedural
remedy was a class suit against the members, with a judgment binding
their joint property. The technical fly in this ointment, however, was
that the cause of action was on a promissory note; a legal rather than
an equitable claim. To circumvent this procedural bar, the inventive
plaintiff invoked the theory of equitable lien and brought a class
suit against the society by service of process on the trustees. He attempted to impose an equitable charge upon the property of the
society that had been benefited by the money loaned. A lien was imposed by the chancellor and the circuit court affirmed stating that by
1948) (concurring opinion). "Conceivably, such an adjudication could be a helpful
step in the process of ultimately reaching any fund existing for general union
purposes, where the union had been guilty of a legal wrong. Such an adjudication
could probably also be made to serve as a foreclosure of all questions against the
members of the union as a group, leaving open only the question in favor of each
individual, who might subsequently be sued and served with summons as a basis
for a personal judgment, whether he had participated in, authorized or ratified
such wrongful acts as the union was found to have committed." See also Developments in the Law -Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV.

874, 934-41 (1958).
102.

68 Fed. 730 (6th Cir. 1895).
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"looking to the circumstances in which this note was given, we think
it cannot be doubted that it was intended to charge the property of
the society."'1 3 In discussing the doctrine of equitable lien, the
court said: 104
Mr. Justice Erle once remarked ... that the words "equitable
lien" are intensely undefined. It is necessarily the case that
something of vagueness and uncertainty should attend a doctrine that is of such wide and varied application as is this
of equitable lien ....
Apparently, employment of equitable liens depends upon the
existence of some particular property that has received a benefit from
the plaintiff. Just how identifiable this property must be is subject
to question.
The doctrine of equitable lien is available in Florida. 0 5 It was
utilized to allow a plaintiff to bring a class action against the members of an unincorporated association in Ross v. Gerung.00 This
action was brought by a plaintiff who had repaired a church building
pursuant to an agreement made with the pastor and chairman of
the church's board of trustees. When the church refused to pay the
repair bill, the plaintiff brought suit against the nine-hundred member congregation in a class action by service of process on three
trustees to secure an equitable lien on the property equal to the
reasonable value of labor and materials supplied. The chancellor
imposed the equitable lien and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
07
holding that:
It is the general rule that even in the absence of an enabling act
"an action may be maintained against an unincorporated association for the purpose of subjecting its property to an
equitable lien where no personal judgment is sought against
the association."
The court said that such liens may arise from contracts that show an
intention to charge some particular property or "they may be dedared by a court of equity out of general consideration of right and
justice as applied to the relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings."l' os In a later case not involving an unincorporated association, the Florida court refused to impose an equi103. Id. at 738.

104. Id. at 739.
105. Armstrong v. Blackadar, 118 So. 2d 854 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
106. 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
107. Id. at 652.
108. Ibid.
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table lien on "mere moral considerations," indicating that the limitations of this doctrine rest within broad judicial discretion. 10 9
Since the existence of a contract is a prerequisite to the imposition
of a statutory lien under chapter 84 of the Florida Statutes," 0 the
court in Ross noted that such a lien could not have been imposed in
the case because of the incapacity of an unincorporated association
to contract. Significantly, the church building was a specific piece
of property directly benefited by the plaintiff, thus facilitating the
invocation of an equitable lien. It is not clear whether the equitable
cause of action that is apparently a condition precedent to the employment of a class action would have been proper had there been
no specific property benefited, even though a common fund was in
existence.
Garnishment
If a common fund does exist, perhaps it could be subjected to
garnishment. This procedure for acquiring jurisdiction over an unincorporated association has apparently not been often attempted."'
In Florida, garnishment is controlled by statute. Florida Statutes,
section 77.01 provides in part that:" 2
Every person who shall have brought a suit to recover a debt
or shall have recovered a judgment in any court of this state
against any person, natural or corporate, shall have a right
to a writ of garnishment, in the manner hereinafter provided,
to subject any indebtedness due to the defendant by a third
person, and any goods, money, chattels or effects of the defendants in the hands, possession or control of a third person.
The statute appears to rule out garnishment proceedings against an
unincorporated association unless jurisdiction has already been acquired over the members because of the requirements that either suit
have been instituted or judgment previously obtained in another lawsuit. It may also be necessary for plaintiff to prove that the association
owns the fund, 113 and in light of the common law ownership rules
previously discussed, this may be an impressive burden.
A writ of garnishment can only be issued when the plaintiff is
seeking to recover a debt."1 By implication this negates garnishment
109.
110.

Dewing v. Nelson, 117 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1960).
ch. 84 (1963).

FLA. STAT.

111. Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private
Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 985, 1081 n.3 (1963).
112. FLA. STAT. §77.01 (1963).
113. See Ibid. "any goods, money, chattels or effects of the defendants ...
114. FLA. STAT. §77.01 (1963).
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when the main action is for an uncertain or contingent amount.
In addition, Florida Statutes, section 77.02, expressly state that garnishment cannot be used when suit is brought on a tort claim until
15
a judgment has been obtained.
6
The Florida statutes also provide for equitable garnishment."
This type of garnishment applies to the narrow situation in which
an equitable suit isbrought against two or more defendants, one of
whom resides within the state and who has property belonging to the
defendants who reside out of the state. Presumably, equitable garnishment could be used to reach the funds of an unincorporated association, when some of the members cannot be personally served with
process within the state, if plaintiff can allege sufficient facts to meet
the tight statutory requirements. But, there is Florida authority indicating that constructive service of process by this method does not
vest a court with sufficient jurisdiction over the defendants to proceed
with the action where personal summons is not served on all of the
owners of the fund. 1 This procedure, however, does not necessarily
offend due process according to the United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, because "it is no impediment to the validity of a judgment
in garnishment that there was no service, constructive or otherwise,
on the debtor of the plaintiff in garnishment ....
This does not exhaust the subject of garnishment, but merely suggests the possibility of invoking it as a method for acquiring jurisdiction over the association's funds without having to serve personally
all the members."1 9
The Association as a MercantileFirm
Some plaintiffs have attempted to sue associations under the provisions of Florida Statutes, section 47.15, which provide for service
of process on a mercantile or other firm by serving its officers or
agents. 20 The Florida courts have repeatedly held that this provision related only to profit making associations such as partnerships.121
Specifically, it does not apply to labor unions, ski dubs, or medical
societies. The courts will probably continue to construe this statute
to be of no assistance to a claimant against a nonprofit group. 22
115.

116.

FLA. STAT. §77.02 (1963).
FLA. STAT. §62.22 (1963).

117. See Ake v. Clancey, 152 Fla. 677, 13 So. 2d 6 (1943).
118. United States Rubber Co. v. Poage, 297 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1962).
119. See generally LaGrone, Garnishment Recovery of Florida Judgments in
this Symposium.
120. FLA. STAT. §47.15 (1963).
121. E.g., Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931).
122. 1959-1960 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 385, 386.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1964],
Art. 4
[Vol. XVII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

BENEATH THE SURFACE

In recommending the measures that could be taken to avoid the
confusion of unincorporated associations, all groups could be required to incorporate. Whether this provision would bring order
where chaos is king remains an academic question. There is no practical method of forcing incorporation upon every casual society that
springs up, and it is questionable whether it would be desirable to
do so. Authors have pointed to the propensity of American people to
form a multitude of organizations with overlapping memberships as
a stabilizing force in society. 123 This intermingling of persons with
diverse views tempers the extremes of social and political ideologies
and promotes the compromises essential to our system of government.
For the law to erect barriers to the freedom of organization could
thwart this exchange of ideas and promote militant dogmatism.
Another factor of inestimable importance in analyzing the law
relating to unincorporated associations is their specific function in
society. Many associations exist for charitable purposes and it is a
truism that the law favors charities. This favoritism is manifested
overtly in statutory granting of tax immunities"2 and covertly by the
immunity from suit implicit in common law procedures. Many of
the cases discussed in this note involved church, citizen's, and other
groups organized to benefit society. It would be a cruel blow to the
members and beneficiaries to subject the treasuries of protected associations to damages in a lawsuit. Were the associations freely suable,
their funds, meant to benefit entire communities, could be dissipated
as the result of the thoughtless act of one member. The tendency to
protect philanthropic ventures may explain some of the obstacles
confronting persons seeking redress against unincorporated associations.
This argument may not withstand analysis, however, because any
nonprofit association can incorporate. 25 Once this voluntary step is
taken, entity status is bestowed upon the group arnd the corporation's
assets can be subjected to levy in execution of judgment in the same
manner as a business corporation.126 This illustrates how the diffuse
and uncertain character of an unincorporated association could be an

123. Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Asso,1
ciations,76 HARV. L. REV. 985, 988 (1963).
.
124. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §501 (c) (3); FLA. STAT. §§192.6,-.07 (I

125. FLA. STAT. ch. 617 (1963). "'[C]orporation not for profit
ration no part of the income of which is distributable to its mem
officers." FLA. STAT. §617.01 (2) (1963).
126. FLA. STAT. ch. 617 (1963).
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advantage over the corporate form. While corporations provide
limited liability from personal judgment, associations may immunize
all funds both personal and joint from execution.
Furthermore, not all unincorporated associations are charities.
Should not unincorporated groups enjoy the same treatment as nonentities, whether their motives are profit, charity, recreation, or
civic? Perhaps the law recognizes that business should be prepared to
pay its own way and that the decision to strive for profit implies consent to the risks involved in earning it. Nonprofit groups are alike
in their disdain for personal enrichment. The point is that not all
nonprofit groups exist for charitable purposes, yet all are protected
by the procedural defense of nonentity status.
To the extent that courts and legislatures permit nonprofit unincorporated associations to be sued as entities reflects value judgments
as to the group's purposes. For example, in Florida, labor unions have
been singled out as being subject to suit, without apparent regard for
the joint rights of individual members.J 27 The enabling statute glosses
over the common law notion that an unincorporated association can128
not own property with a cavalier reference to "common property."'
CONCLUSION

From a practical standpoint, it may be argued that since most
unincorporated associations are composed of public-spirited citizens,
they are not likely to allow their debts to go unpaid. Associations
dependent upon the community for support will not want their goals
impaired by an unfavorable reputation. Merchants and other business people with whom the association may have to deal in the future
will certainly be wary of those groups known to be unreliable in
paying or performing. This somewhat philosophical approach, however, may provide little solace to an injured creditor.
Tort victims may likewise be rendered remediless against the association. They always have recourse against the individual tortfeasor, so their plight may not be as desparate as might appear. Injustice results when the association is wealthy, but the wrongdoer is a
penniless "agent."
To those who would deal with unincorporated associations the
dangers are dearly defined. Preventative measures are a necessity.
The best protection would be to require the association to pay all
obligations in gdvance. Alternatives would be to make escrow agreements or to ,ost bonds. Without these arrangements it would be
advisable to have solvent members sign or indorse contracts or notes
127.
128.

FLA. STAi.
Ibid.

11 (1963).
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in their individual capacities. If the group is a new one or its members unknown, it may well be necessary to insist on cash transactions.
In any event, if a person purports to act for the association it should
be ascertained that he has full authority from the group.
This is not to say that all the uncertainties of unincorporated associations can be avoided. There may be no adequate safeguards that
will insure absolute protection against the hazards of enforcing claims
against these elusive groups. Seeking absolutes when unincorporated
associations are involved is undoubtedly a futile task. Those foolish
enough to try may discover they are chasing a mirage.
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